Is U.S. manufacturing growing or shrinking?

Here’s a little known fact: U.S. manufacturing has actually been growing as an economic output in the U.S. for at least 60 years. Here’s another: China is now the largest manufacturing nation. So there you are: U.S. manufacturing has been growing, but China is now #1.

If you don’t believe me, here are two charts, published in the New York Times (Sept. 11, 2011). The chart on the right shows overall output, growing steadily over decades with only brief setbacks. Whether the trend will continue upward, or represents the end of an era, depends on whether you’re an optimist or a pessimist.

We’re used to hearing that U.S. manufacturing is declining, but the chart on the left shows that it’s only declining as a share of overall economic output. Other sectors are simply growing more quickly. The U.S. is producing more output in information-intensive industries (such as finance) and less in labor-intensive industries (such as manufacturing). Even the manufacturing tends to be more information-intensive. The U.S. is strong in things like jet engines and pharmaceuticals, whereas for sneakers you think of Asia.

There are issues, to be sure. Most importantly, growth in output does not necessarily mean growth in jobs, and a country needs jobs for its people. Also, China’s manufacturing output is growing much faster than the U.S. Much of that was done by making the pie bigger, but some was done by taking share from other countries. The gains in share are not just in sneakers, but in things like laptop computers (Lenovo) and telecom switches (Huawei).

This is obviously a complex topic--just ask anyone at your next cocktail party or Occupy Wall Street event. And to be precise, manufacturing output did decline during the down years of recessions, when the whole economy slowed.

Just the same, it might cheer some of you as we enter the winter to know that U.S. manufacturing has been growing for nearly all of the last 60 years, and more.

More on the fiscal year effect

I got several questions about my chart a couple weeks ago that showed two different curves for the laser market depending on when you count your fiscal year. I'm taking some space here to explain it a little better.  The chart is below, and shows the quarterly results of representative laser suppliers aggregated over two different 12-months cycles: January to December and the same data for July to June.

The first question is: why does it matter? For one thing, if your company reports revenues on a year from--say--July 1 to June 30, your results will look very different than your competitor that reports from January 1 to December 31. Every company I know of reports their quarterly numbers quarter-over-quarter and year-over-year, of course. For what that's worth, that quarterly information becomes a common denominator. But the quarterly nuances are lost in the annual reports.

For example, TRUMPF had a rousing year ending June 30, with about 50% growth measured in both dollars or euros. That's fantastic, but keep in mind that TRUMPF doesn't report quarterly numbers. It doesn't have to report numbers at all, since it's a private company. The very good fiscal year followed two years of declines. Most companies reporting on calendar years only had one down year: 2009. So, TRUMPF looked like it was doing worse than everybody for two years, and now it looks like it outperformed. In fact, it's about the same--it just reports on different calendar.

The other question is: how can it make that much difference? In this recession, the four worst quarters all fell in 2009. So any company reporting on the calendar year saw a really bad 2009 and only upward results after that. TRUMPF simply split the bad quarters, spreading the bad quarters over two fiscal years.

There is one more nuance to this. People are most familiar and emotional about the metrics that they know best, not necessarily the ones that I have to use. For example, salespeople often speak of orders and pricing for sales that haven't happened yet, since that is where they are working with their customers. But those orders and pricing may be unrepresentative of orders earlier this year.

Another example is that people rejoice over recent good news and panic over recent bad news--even if it is stripped of its context. Part of my job is to put the context back.

The capex derivative for ICs (Part III)

Last week, I reviewed how solar charts can point up and up, yet the sales of lasers into solar fab tools can languish because they go as the derivative, not directly with sales. In this post, I will show how the same thing happens in semiconductor chips. And for that matter, in any capital equipment business.

The shipments of the end product made from semiconductor fab tools tend to go up and up (the Great Recession notwithstanding) because the world keeps getting bigger.  The installed base of tools tracks that trend.  (The installed base and chip revenues don't completely march in step, since installed equipment can sit idle, or chip prices can fluctuate.)  But the shipments of new tools tracks the 1st derivative of the installed base--you only ship new tools to add capacity or upgrade dated equipment.  The laser sales track this trend--the 1st derivative.  (It's actually the 2nd derivative of the revenues generated by the electronics, but that's not important here.)

That's shown in the figure below, using actual data for the semiconductor industry over the last several years. The installed base (in units of 10 million 200-mm equivalent wafer starts per month--got that?) ramps up and up. The current recession was an exception, when so many companies closed fabs that the installed base actually declined. But that's rare.


Source: SEMI


While the end product shipments grew and grew, the capex spending itself oscillated dramatically during that time.  While the capex business is a sizable business of its own, it isn't really growing so much as it's cyclic. Let that be a lesson.

Of course, we could make similar charts for displays, data storage, and any capital equipment business you like.

The important thing to remember is that the equipment shipments don't scale with the production, they go as the derivative. That's how component sales can languish even as forecasts for a downstream product go up and up.

The 2nd Derivative Capex Paradox Update

Jay Liebowitz recently commented on my Second Derivative Paradox where I explain how capital equipment markets can gyrate wildly even though the end-use product grows steadily.  Among other things, he points out that equipment sales can surge even when there is excess capacity because companies need to retool for new products.  This can happen because of the steady progress of technology: smaller via holes or more thin-film solar modules.  It can also happen if certain lines are specially qualified and others aren't. 

I can add that the inefficiencies of capitalism play in the equipment makers' favor: the churn in end-product manufacturers moves the manufacturing from company to company, creating shortage in new places and surplus in others.  So, even though a manufacturer has excess overall capacity, it may have to tool up a new line because that line has different requirements than its other ones.   

I am re-running the earlier posts below if you haven't seen them or can't link to them.  They are here and here.  I didn't update the solar numbers since my point is more conceptual.

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How could equipment sales in an exponentially-growing market be anything but upward? It happens all the time. Welcome to the 2nd-Derivative Paradox. That's my name for the trap that one can fall into when it comes to capital equipment markets. Solar is a great example. It's hard to explain the paradox, though, so bear with me.


Start with installed capacity. If you are a power generator, you think in terms of the cumulative installed generating capacity in the world. This is what the users actually use. The figure shows three scenarios how that might play out, and they all look pretty much the same in this chart. Nice, steep slopes. Note how they all start at the same point and end up at the same point.



Then look at panel shipments. But the solar panel industry isn't interested in what's already out there. It needs to ship new panels every year. The shipments amount to a 1st derivative: the new capacity that's added to the infrastructure every year. Now the differences in the scenarios show through, as shown in the second figure. But the scenarios all show steep upward growth. What's to worry about?

Now look at panel manufacturing equipment. The solar manufacturing equipment industry, and that includes lasers--isn't even interested in solar shipments, but the need for more manufacturing capacity to make the panels. You only need more equipment when you are shipping more panels than before. That amounts to a 2nd derivative of the cumulative generating capacity, and can give wildly different results. New equipment is shipped in all three scenarios, but in the "sustaining" scenario the equipment shipments are flat year after year, while in the "slowing" scenario they start out strong, but then decline. Ouch.

Other traps. Of course we would all like to live in the "growing" scenario. The trouble is, strong positive exponential growth doesn't last indefinitely, no matter what they say. And that's not even considering some ups and downs along the way, like this year. A slight shift in the solar panel shipments wreaks total havoc for equipment shipments.



Other things that juice equipment sales. The same trap exists in other industries, too. But there are other details to consider. First, there is usually some churn in suppliers. Machines also get obsolete. And there is also the early obsolescence forced by things like Moore's Law. These all have to be considered.

Watch that 2nd derivative. Don't get me wrong. I love solar. I had a summer job at TI testing solar cells back in the Jimmy Carter era. We all believe it's going to be a great thing in coming decades. But it's not enough that the cumulative generating capacity will be on a steep upward slope for years to come, because when it comes to manufacturing equipment, it's the 2nd derivative that counts.


Some real numbers.  What happens when we plug in some numbers that may be more or less what we expect the solar market to be?



I’ve done that in this figure. The first thing to notice is that the cumulative generating capacity—the top curve and what the power companies think about—goes up all through the forecast.

The next thing you notice is that the new module shipments—that’s the middle curve—takes a dip in 2009. This isn’t too surprising, given the recession, tight credit, and low oil prices. The dip isn’t too big and it’s in record territory again by 2011.

But what is really interesting is the bottom curve. That’s the new factory capacity that’s needed to make the modules each year. This correlates directly to lasers sold for making cells. That curve actually goes to zero, even negative, for a couple of years. And even in the recovery it only hangs around the 2008 level through 2013. In other words, the laser sales will not rocket upwards like the module sales through 2013.

Of course, there are some problems with this simple chart. The new factory capacity (laser sales) probably don’t go negative. That would mean companies were taking equipment out of commission. While I have heard of this happening in 2009, it’s not widespread. Companies want to be ready for the recovery. And, there are always new suppliers, and old suppliers expanding and upgrading equipment. That raises sales above zero.

On the other hand, there is also inventory in the supply chain and used equipment for sale. That pushes the recovery further into the future.

To a first approximation, the chart is a good model, and a good example of what I call the "second derivative paradox." At least it’s better than looking at the other two curves and assuming something similar.

What a weak dollar means to photonics

The dollar has been declining steadily again (see figure) but how much difference does it make to lasers and photonics? A lot to any salesperson who is competing in an export business. A falling dollar is like a discount in the price given to the buyer. And it can mean a lot to the value that we analysts assign to markets (such as in our new market estimate). For example, a falling dollar inflates the value in dollars of the production of Japanese blue-violet diode lasers for Blu-Ray players. But it doesn't mean a lot overall, for a lot of reasons. Why is that?


The conventional wisdom is that a falling dollar makes U.S. goods and services cheaper abroad, and foreign goods and services more expensive in the U.S. That is, it makes U.S. goods more competitive, and it deflates U.S. debt owed others as counted in foreign currency.

But many companies don't sell directly to companies abroad. A more complete downstream product may be exported by the customer's customer, but either way, the effect may be minimal--or at least obscure--to the photonics manufacturer.

Second, companies commonly import subcomponents from all over the world. A lower dollar then raises the cost to manufacture, erasing some or all of the advantages when it exports the complete product.

And, a lot of companies manufacture in the destination markets. This can help hedge against changes in currencies, among other things. In the example of Japanese blue-violet diode lasers, it changes the average prices and overall value, in dollars, that we assign to a market. But that can seem rather artificial when most of the Blu-Ray players are assembled in Asia anyway.

More often, the gains and losses from a falling dollar amount mostly to changes in market share: U.S. companies vs. non-U.S. companies, and U.S. importers vs. U.S. exporters.

For an explanation how a falling dollar is unlikely to create many new jobs in the U.S., read this article. It cites the reasons above, and notes that much of U.S. manufacturing is capital intensive, not labor-intensive. And, many manufacturers are small and not likely to ramp up hiring dramatically even if sales do improve.

Just the same, every little bit helps, especially if it means tipping a business from the red to the black or deeper into the black.

How the jobless recovery helps lasers

Several laser segments have recovered surprisingly well in this recession. This is after my warnings over the last two years that capital equipment markets take it especially hard in a recession. So what gives? Who needs new capital equipment when factories are running at lower capacity?

Enter the jobless recovery. Plant managers are talking about buying more efficient tools that operate more efficiently. In good times, this means buying a new tool to do more with the same staff. In recessions, this means buying a new tool to do more with less. Lasers play a role because they are used in big machine tools like sheet metal cutters.

Companies have cash. They are using it to buy back stock, buy capital equipment, and increase their reserves. What they're not doing is hiring workers.

There's a lot more to it than just the jobless recovery. There's the turnaround of the electronics industry after a two year slide. There's China. There are segments that are less sensitive to recessions. And so on.

But the jobless recovery explains why so much of the laser market is recovering as well as it is.

The capex derivative & solar--Part 2

In a previous post, I discussed how steep upward growth for a market doesn’t necessarily mean steep upward growth all along the supply chain. In fact, solar cell manufacturing is an example where sales can go wildly negative even as the power generators see upward growth. In the original post, I considered three different scenarios that made my point very nicely. But what happens when we plug in some numbers that may be more or less what we expect the solar market to be?

I’ve done that in this figure. The first thing to notice is that the cumulative generating capacity—the top curve and what the power companies think about—goes up all through the forecast.

The next thing you notice is that the new module shipments—that’s the middle curve—takes a dip in 2009. This isn’t too surprising, given the recession, tight credit, and low oil prices. The dip isn’t too big and it’s in record territory again by 2011.

But what is really interesting is the bottom curve. That’s the new factory capacity that’s needed to make the modules each year. This correlates directly to lasers sold for making cells. That curve actually goes to zero, even negative, for a couple of years. And even in the recovery it only hangs around the 2008 level through 2013. In other words, the laser sales will not rocket upwards like the module sales through 2013.

Of course, there are some problems with this simple chart. The new factory capacity (laser sales) probably don’t go negative. That would mean companies were taking equipment out of commission. While I have heard of this happening in 2009, it’s not widespread. Companies want to be ready for the recovery. And, there are always new suppliers, and old suppliers expanding and upgrading equipment. That raises sales above zero.

On the other hand, there is also inventory in the supply chain and used equipment for sale. That pushes the recovery further into the future.

To a first approximation, the chart is a good model, and a good example of what I call the "second derivative paradox." At least it’s better than looking at the other two curves and assuming something similar.

January 13, 2010

On using the downturn and dumb luck

It's become a cliche that companies can use downturns to their advantage. Now there's an analyst from Bain & Co. who actually has the data. As he says in a piece on NPR this morning, it's like companies use the curve in a car race to gain advantage against stronger competitors, while using the straightaway to hold it.

The Bain analyst, Darrell Rigby, has data to show that market share changes the most in the chaos of the downturn. It's not surprising: at best, the downturn changes the game. At worst, it brings out all the weaknesses in a company.

Since they start out with the most market share, the biggest companies have the most to lose. They have deeper pockets, but they also have inherent inefficiencies that come with any large organization. These are the inefficiencies of running a global sales network, of running operations across many end-user sectors, across multiple technologies, and so on. There's a cost to doing all that.

Companies with the next generation products may not be doing well now, but they will seize market share coming out of the recovery. This favors fiber lasers, LED lighting, and new imaging tools like OCT and optical molecular imaging.

But let's admit it: luck also plays a huge part. We deal in macro trends at Strategies Unlimited. But it's my view that, at the micro scale, a lot of business is just dumb luck. Companies are simply in the right place at the right time.

That may feel insulting to the many hard-working engineers and sales staff who nurture relationships, often over years, to bring a product to market. When things go well, it's natural to give credit to all that hard work. But looking at it from a statistical point of view, some will get the new business and some won't. Many of those who lost the business also worked hard, and even did the right things, but the business simply went elsewhere.

The solar market and the 2nd-Derivative Paradox

How could equipment sales in an exponentially-growing market be anything but upward? It happens all the time. Welcome to the 2nd-Derivative Paradox. That's my name for the trap that one can fall into when it comes to capital equipment markets. Solar is a great example. It's hard to explain the paradox, though, so bear with me.

Start with installed capacity. If you are a power generator, you think in terms of the cumulative installed generating capacity in the world. This is what the users actually use. The figure shows three scenarios how that might play out, and they all look pretty much the same in this chart. Nice, steep slopes. Note how they all start at the same point and end up at the same point.

Then look at panel shipments. But the solar panel industry isn't interested in what's already out there. It needs to ship new panels every year. The shipments amount to a 1st derivative: the new capacity that's added to the infrastructure every year. Now the differences in the scenarios show through, as shown in the second figure. But the scenarios all show steep upward growth. What's to worry about?

Now look at panel manufacturing equipment. The solar manufacturing equipment industry, and that includes lasers--isn't even interested in solar shipments, but the need for more manufacturing capacity to make the panels. You only need more equipment when you are shipping more panels than before. That amounts to a 2nd derivative of the cumulative generating capacity, and can give wildly different results. New equipment is shipped in all three scenarios, but in the "sustaining" scenario the equipment shipments are flat year after year, while in the "slowing" scenario they start out strong, but then decline. Ouch.

Other traps. Of course we would all like to live in the "growing" scenario. The trouble is, strong positive exponential growth doesn't last indefinitely, no matter what they say. And that's not even considering some ups and downs along the way, like this year. A slight shift in the solar panel shipments wreaks total havoc for equipment shipments.

Other things that juice equipment sales. The same trap exists in other industries, too. But there are other details to consider. First, there is usually some churn in suppliers. Machines also get obsolete. And there is also the early obsolescence forced by things like Moore's Law. These all have to be considered.

Watch that 2nd derivative. Don't get me wrong. I love solar. I had a summer job at TI testing solar cells back in the Jimmy Carter era. We all believe it's going to be a great thing in coming decades. But it's not enough that the cumulative generating capacity will be on a steep upward slope for years to come, because when it comes to manufacturing equipment, it's the 2nd derivative that counts.

"There will be growth in the spring"

Our family recently watched the film classic "Being There" with Peter Sellers. It's the source of the phrase, "There will be growth in the spring." The character's proclamation arose from a misunderstanding, but was quickly seized on by politicians, the media, and a public weary of recession.

Modest growth, but better than none. Well, we've updated some numbers and in this recession, it really does look like there will be growth in the spring. Actually, it's happening right now in many segments, just modestly. In fact, the issue isn't whether there will be growth, but how much. We're talking growth around 10% for the most part, which is pretty modest on a quarterly basis. Stronger growth in sectors like semiconductor fab tools and telecom network equipment.

Forecasting is harder than it looks. You might think that predicting growth in 2010 is about as simple-minded as the character's observations in the film. Far from it. I cringe at so-called futurists who paint dramatic pictures of the future, without giving some near-term due dates or without working through some fairly obvious contradictions. Likewise for cheerleaders who think that the recession can be just wished away. (See one of my blog entries in April about this form of Coueism, here.)

Quarterly trends help. Our forecast is based on quarterly trends among key suppliers and customers in leading product sectors. With visibility within the supply chain barely better than at the beginning of this recession, every segment must be evaluated carefully with respect to what's possible. A strong comeback in telecom systems next year? Quite possible. A strong comeback in heavy manufacturing? Not likely at all. Modest growth? Possibly. (See for example comments from Fabtech from my colleague, David Belforte.)

Some context. To add some context, it now looks as if the stock market bottomed in March 2009, the GDP bottomed this fall, net employment will start increasing in 2010, and outstanding home foreclosures will start declining in 2011. You can't point to one thing and say "that's when the economy turned around." It's more complicated than that.

We will leak out more details as it firms up. Stay tuned. And remember, "there will be growth in the spring."

Who's ahead in photonics stocks

In the last post, I noted that some photonics stocks have done nicely in 2009 following the crash one year ago. My very cursory examinations suggests that a few companies in the LED space are doing very nicely indeed. Other are making good progress toward their 2007 and 2008 levels, even if there is a way to go.

Why it matters. A rising stock market is a sign that investors think that earnings (that is, profits) will rise over coming years. It also makes all those pesky owners happy so that layoffs will stop and staff can breathe easier. And sometimes the employee is one of those owners (or has an option to become one). So, a rising stock price is usually good news, provided you remember that it is a secondary market, something of a beauty contest. Not being a Wall Street financial analyst type, I generally stay away from following stock prices, but sometimes it's illuminating.

High fliers. One of the stars right now is Cree, the LED supplier. Its stock price has tripled from its low, and is well above its 2008 peak. Aixtron is even better, at about 6X above its low, and double its 2008 peak. Cymer has doubled to recover to its 2007 level. I think it's safe to say these stocks are ahead of the overall market average, although it depends on where you start counting.

Holding their own. Others are holding their own against the NASDAQ average. Omnivision is up about 3-4X from its low, more or less in its earlier territory. Coherent has approximately doubled, getting closer to its usual territory. FLIR hasn't reached its all-time peak, but it's back to some of its 2008 level. IPG is getting there.

In the dog house. Some companies seem to be in a long U-shaped recession, well below the overall stock market. Rofin is deep into manufacturing, where the stock market doesn't expect good earnings for a while. Telecom system vendors like Alcatel-Lucent, Ciena, and Infinera are also well below the NASDAQ average for the period. Especially Infinera.

What about P/E ratios? High prices are nice, but what about the P/E ratio? That would say something about the kind of stock bargains that are out there. Here the news isn't so good. High-flying Cree is at 94 today. Cymer is near 300, Rofin at 75. But this is hardly fair, since these companies actually have positive earnings even now, and while many others don't. More down-to-earth, by the way, is FLIR, at a P/E ratio of 20.

I couldn't post the Yahoo graphs into this blog, but you can run the charts yourself here.

The photonics market, one year later

Do you believe the stock market, GDP, or unemployment figures? Are we in a recovery, or still in recession? V-shaped, W-shaped, or U-shaped? As we do our annual survey and forecast for Laser Focus World magazine and the upcoming Marketplace Seminar, a lot of this gets mixed up. There will be more to come later, but here are some early thoughts.

Many public photonics companies have seen great stock returns. The stock market looks at future earnings--that is, profits--regardless of jobs or where the jobs are. A rising market says that investors think the future is good, and it's good for employee stock options and so forth. Some photonics stocks have shot way up, well beyond the average. LED companies in particular. Even those that haven't are seeing a bounce off the bottom, suggesting that it won't get worse. Stay tuned to this blog for more on this.

Small photonics companies span the spectrum. The stock market doesn't say anything about small businesses, but there are far more small, private photonics companies than public ones. I love these companies because many are much more profitable than their more visible brethren. For example, think of suppliers for military contracts, medical systems, and so forth. But, small businesses have very little wiggle room in a recession like this. California public radio explained it well in a piece today, using the example of a maker of tortilla-making equipment that sells for up to $3 million. It has gone from 55 employees to 9, and still has problems getting credit a year into the crisis.

Large capital equipment to make large capital equipment is hit hardest. The radio piece highlights a point I've been making, that the recession will be especially long for companies that make large capital equipment, and especially large capital equipment that makes large capital equipment. So for example, the market for welding systems for making cars is likely to be slow for another year or two, while the LED market will jump ahead next year.

Use economic indicators with caution. Use economic indicators with caution. One tool for forecasting is to look at economic indicators. Of course, they are complicated, but they can be very useful. But you do need to understand some of the limitations of the indicators, though. For example, Joe Webb points out in his blog article for the print industry how leading indicators often get it wrong. The blog piece is appropriately titled, "Beware the Cheerleaders."

Even as we all bask in the news that the economy grew last quarter, economists are working to correct errors that likely overstate the value of GDP growth. When goods and services are moved offshore, the total value may be counted in the current accounts, but it may not be allocated correctly to specific industries. It's as if you compare two companies that manufacture in China: one outsources it while the other operates it itself. The productivity of the former would look better than the latter if you don't count the outsourced labor.

A similar issue arises when you look at the trade deficit but not the entire current accounts, or for that matter, capital accounts. So what if iPhones are made in China? China adds only a few percent of the value, Japan adds much more, but the U.S. captures as much as 50% of the retail value. Yet, it looks as if it is imported from China so the other contributions are lost in our trade statistics. It should wash out in China's numbers, but not all of it will wash out in the U.S. numbers. But that is part of a very large topic, better saved for another time.

Growth in laser sales over 40 years

Wondering what the laser business looks like over the last 40 years? If past issues of Laser Focus World are any indication, the industry gets a downturn about every 8 to 10 years. That's what I found looking through 40 years of issues.

See for yourself. The figure shows the estimates for the laser market dating to 1969, using data from the annual market articles. It's charted on a log scale to show the growth rate. I had to make some adjustments to the original data, to account for revisions, changes in categories, and stuff like that. Also, in the early years, there was a large contract R&D business that isn't included in this chart.

The downturns are marked by arrows. If you consider that downturns tend to spread over a few years, from the first signs of slowing to the return of the past peak, then the downturns have been a regular part of the industry over 40 years. Thankfully, the upward climb has made the impact fairly modest, compared to other industries.

I don't believe that markets are deterministic. That is, past performance is not an indicator of future behavior. But the pattern of downturns does suggest that there is an underlying cyclic nature to the laser industry, and it will become more important as the upward growth rate slows.

Oh, and don't forget to get your latest laser market information from us and at the upcoming Laser Focus World Marketplace Seminar.

The Early Peak Effect in the photonics market

Our new market report highlights something I call the “early peak” effect that appears a lot in capital equipment sales, including many laser products. It’s what happens when you sell some lasers into a new application, and then sales drop off when the customers have installed all the lasers they need. It’s so typical of the micro materials processing market that I have come to include it in some forecasts.

Here are the phases:
· Rollout of lasers for a new application
· The early peak in sales
· Saturation of the installed base
· Early wearout and upgrades
· A second “baby boomlet” as replacements for wearouts peak

If you don’t account for the early peak effect, you can overestimate laser sales by assuming that sales continue at peak levels, year after year. The news of new applications have surprisingly wide reach and long tails, feeding the perception that sales are higher than they really are, especially if the application is really cool, like stent cutting.

What keeps the market going is that there are new applications launched on a regular basis that smoothes out the overall growth in the market. But, sales any particular company can be very choppy. And, the mix of products grows more diverse with every new application in the market.

A laser salesperson will recognize the early peak effect, but it gets lost when you look at overall market numbers. It’s not hard to explain to the old-timers in the business, but it doesn’t have a ready label, as far as I know. I couldn’t come up with a better name for it, so for now it’s the “early peak effect.” If you want to call it the “Hausken effect,” that’s fine with me, too.

The fear factor in a capital equipment market

I hear a lot of talk about fear these days. "It's just fear that's driving the market." "If people could get over their fear..." I don't find such talk very helpful, and here's why.

We work in an industry that is mostly driven by capital equipment purchases. Big purchases have to be financed. You can think of it this way: the customers borrow money to buy the equipment, and pay it off with the revenues they will get in the future. Even if they use cash to buy the equipment, they could have used the cash for something else (like generating interest itself), so they have to cover that opportunity cost.

In times like these, the customers are no dummies--their confidence in the future has dropped enough that they delay buying new capital equipment. Think about it: are you looking for a new car right now? Or are you thinking of a used car, or maybe keeping the one you have a little longer? Is that fear?

No, fear is too strong a word. It connotes panic. From my discussions with customers, at the financial level, they aren't in a panic. They aren't reacting out of emotion. They have a reasoned, albeit cautious, approach. But all these microdecisions add up, and that hurts suppliers.

What will bring back the confidence to buy new capital equipment? Inexpensive and available credit helps. Rising demand in the end-user markets helps, such as that stimulated by government spending. New product innovation helps, by motivating industrial customers to replace inefficient equipment with new equipment. Finally, understanding how the customer thinks--and the customers' customers--helps.

Fear does indeed drive speculative markets like the stock market. Fear and greed. But not capital equipment purchases.

How we forecast 2009 even with low visibility

Now that our laser market report is out, it's helpful to explain how we can do forecasts for 2009 when the visibility is only about 3 months. I won't go into all the detail about forecasting. I want to focus on how we used quarterly data to narrow the range of forecasts.

We have a lot of information about suppliers and customers for quarters up to December, 2008. What's striking is how 2008 was generally ahead of 2007, even though the last quarter was bad for most everyone. This varies from sector to sector, but for the most part it's true.

The figure shows actual laser revenues for several selected companies through Q4 2008. It then shows what happens if all the quarters in 2009 are reset to a level near or below Q4 2008. As good as 2008 was overall, 2009 comes out well below that. Continuing the decline into Q1 2009, but no further, yields a decline of 32% for 2009 over 2008. It turns out that this supplier-side approach also matches our projections for 2009 in general from the demand side, aggregating all the different segments together.

What's useful about this approach is not that it predicts each quarter (it doesn't), but that it narrows the range of plausible projections. Of course, anything is possible in 2009, but running simple scenarios like this helps to test a hypothesis.

It also allows us to update the range of possible outcomes as the year proceeds. By Q4 2009, the error bars for 2009 will be much narrower, while the focus shifts to 2010.

It also illustrates the range of outcomes from, say, a recovery, or of a price war. Either one could move the overall 2009 revenues up or down, especially if it happens early in the year. A recovery late in the year won't affect the overall 2009 revenues as much.

This is an example how we use an analytical tool, and this one is especially useful when the market is in a period of rapid change, as it is today.

Our new laser forecast--get used to cycles

Our new forecast for the fiber laser and industrial laser market is now out. It should be no surprise that 2009 isn't going to be pretty. We now expect the industrial laser market to end up 32% below 2008, if sales continue to follow their current levels. This puts that market at $1.7 billion, about the level of 2004. Fiber laser suppliers will see a shallower decline of 24% to $230 million, and will experience a faster recovery than other types of lasers. But if the recession deepens or if suppliers engage in a desperate price war, 2009 sales will fall further.

In other words, the days of a nearly unbroken string of growth for both fiber lasers and industrial lasers is over. For the next several years the business will be much more cyclic, like the capital equipment market that it is. We still expect the envelope of the laser market to expand over time, but the swings of the cycles will be much more apparent.

By the way, this forecast only reports on industrial lasers that could be available to fiber lasers. It excludes most diode lasers, and also big excimer lasers for lithography. So, it's best to compare the numbers only to our previous reports.

In fact, if you have questions, send me an email (thausken@strategies-u.com) and I'll try to explain how we came up with the numbers.

A plea to maintain opto prices

How much will price erosion destroy opto revenues this year? That's one of the great unknowns in forecasting the market for 2009. Will suppliers behave themselves and hold prices above their costs? Or will they sell products at any price just to get cash flow for another quarter?

It's bad enough that the demand for components is sharply down as a result of the recession. Cutting prices only makes it worse. It's not like a company can brag about having market share if they lose money on every product going out the door. And in most of the opto market, high prices aren't holding back--the worldwide recession is to blame for that.

This is what has happened for years to several companies in telecom components. Some were selling below their cost. Consistently. And it spoiled the market for everybody.

I have to admit that I would be the first to argue that, in the end, the market forces ultimately prevail. That is, if there are enough competitors and the situation is desperate enough, suppliers will cut and run to get any business at all. Asking suppliers to remain calm and rational is not likely to make a difference.

And if fact, since last fall I've heard of discounts of as deep as 30% and 50% on standard prices. And then there's the used equipment market. What's a supplier to do when it is competing against its own products on the gray (used equipment) market?

Just the same, I hope that suppliers can look longer term and stick to a sustainable business strategy. It's going to be a long, cold recession and companies will be better off if they huddle together for warmth than if they wander off alone.

Why forecasting matters in a hurricane

Someone asked the other day, what good is market analysis now, especially if you couldn't foresee the global recession before it hit?

It's a bit like asking, "What's the point of weather forecasting when the hurricane is already here?"

For those who won't last the hurricane intact, it may not matter. But for those who think they will survive, they want to know how bad things are, how to prioritize, where the bargains may be, and where the new opportunities will be afterward.

Companies are making hard decisions, and they come to us to get another opinion , as an extension to their market development, for financial due diligence, or for the "satellite view" of the landscape.

Even in better times, conditions can change rapidly. There are new demands from customers, new technology solutions, and new competitors. Running a business is a perpetual challenge.

That never changes.